INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION -

COMMERCE - ARBITRABILITY OF ANTITRUST CLAIMS ARISING FROM INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES RECOGNIZED UNDER FEDERAL ARBITRATION AcT-Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-

outh, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
Although the English common law traditionally exhibited an
antipathy to non-judicial resolution of disputes,' the recent trend
in the United States has been to recognize and enforce these decisions and the resulting awards. 2 One illustration of this tendency is the increasingly popular use of arbitration' as a method
of resolving international trade disputes. Resort to arbitration is
due in part to the perceived speed, efficiency, and informality of
the proceedings, as well as the growing reluctance among businesses to litigate in foreign courts.4
Notwithstanding a national policy encouraging arbitration of
commercial disputes, 5 the federal judiciary maintains that certain
public law issues must be resolved by the courts in order to protect the public interest involved. 6 Federal courts, for example,
have held that domestic disputes involving the securities and an-

I See, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978,
983-84 (2d Cir. 1942) (arbitration agreements believed to be contrary to public
policy because they "oust jurisdiction" of courts).
2 See United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)), which initiated a national public policy favoring arbitration. This position was strengthened further by the United States' ratification of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
AwardsJune 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (implemented at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982)). The United States Supreme Court in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), cited the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act as "reversing centuries ofjudicial hostility to arbitration agreements." Id. at 510.
3 Arbitration is defined as "[a]n arrangement for taking and abiding by the
judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to
established tribunals of justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay,
the expense and vexation of ordinary litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (5th
ed. 1979) (citation omitted). See generally Emerson, History of Arbitration Practiceand
Law, 19 CLEV. ST. L.R. 155 (1970).
4 See Allison, Arbitrationof PrivateAntitrust Claims in InternationalTrade: A Study in
the Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a World Market, 18 INr'L L. &
POL. 361, 378-80 (1986); Ehrenhaft, Effective International Commercial Arbitration, 9
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1191, 1191-94 (1977).
5 See supra note 2.
6 See A. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, 359-

82 (1981); Aksen, Arbitration and Antitrust-Are They Compatible?, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1097, 1104 (1969); Loevinger, Antitrust Issues as Subjects of Arbitration, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1085, 1089-91 (1969).
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titrust laws are nonarbitrable. 7 In an international context, however, the enforcement of arbitration agreements have an added
dimension. This area concerns whether domestic policies should
be subordinated to both the national policy favoring transnational arbitration and the broader interest of bolstering world
trade.' The United States Supreme Court recently confronted
this question in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.' In Mitsubishi, the Court held that an agreement to arbitrate
international contractual disputes was enforceable despite the
presence of antitrust claims.10
In October 1979, Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (Soler)" entered into an agreement with Chrysler International, S.A. (CISA),
a wholly owned subsidiary of Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler). 2
Pursuant to this agreement, Soler was granted the right to distribute, within the San Juan, Puerto Rico metropolitan area, certain vehicles manufactured by Mitsubishi Motors Corporation
(Mitsubishi) 3 for Chrysler. 4 At the same time, Soler, Mitsubishi, and CISA executed a Sales Procedure Agreement (Agreement) designed to facilitate the sale of Mitsubishi manufactured
vehicles to Soler.' 5 Paragraph VI of the Agreement provided for
arbitration in Japan of all disputes arising between Mitsubishi
and Soler.16 Arbitration was to be conducted in Japan according
7 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (section 14 of 1933 Securities Act
negates arbitration agreement); Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978) (antitrust claims nonarbitrable); Cobb v.
Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974) (antitrust issues nonarbitrable unless arbitration
agreement negotiated after dispute arises); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P.
Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (arbitration deemed inappropriate for
antitrust claims).
8 See generally Johnson, International Antitrust Litigation and Arbitration Clauses, 3
J.L. & CoM. 91 (1983); Ovington, Arbitrationand U.S. Antitrust Law: A Conflict of Policies, 2J. INT'L ARB. 53, 53-60 (1985).
9 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
1o See id. at 3361.
II Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. is a Puerto Rican corporation having its principal place of business in Pueblo Viejo, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico. Id. at 3349.
12 Id.
13 Mitsubishi Motors is a Japanese corporation with its principal place of business in Tokyo, Japan. Id. Mitsubishi Motors is the product of a joint venture between Chrysler International, S.A., a Swiss corporation, and Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Inc., a Japanese corporation. Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. The agreement did not create a franchisor-franchisee relationship between Mitsubishi and Soler. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985) (Nos. 83-1569 and 83-1733)
[hereinafter Brief of Petitioner].
16 Witsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3349. Specifically, paragraph VI provided:
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to the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration
17
Association and to be governed by the laws of Switzerland.
During the first year of its dealership, Soler sold a substantial
amount of Mitsubishi manufactured vehicles.' 8 One year later, in
1981, the automobile market declined and Soler found itself unable to sell its minimum sales commitment.' 9 In an attempt to
alleviate the problem, Soler requested permission to ship a
number of vehicles to the continental United States and Latin
America. 20 Chrysler and Mitsubishi refused to permit transshipment and, subsequently, Soler's financial position worsened. 2 '
Eventually, Mitsubishi was forced to withhold shipment in Japan
All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between [Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to Article I-B through V of this
Agreement or for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Japan
Commercial Arbitration Association.
Id. (citation omitted).
Article 22 of the Distributorship Agreement between CISA and Soler was incorporated by reference into the Sales Procedure Agreement. Article 22 provides:
This Agreement is made in, and will be governed by and construed in all
respects according to the laws of the Swiss Confederation as if entirely
performed therein.. .[.] If it is found that any portion or portions of this
Agreement violate in any particular any law of any government or governmental unit, division or subdivision having jurisdiction in the premises, and said violation would cause said authorities to consider this
Agreement as void and without effect regardless of the present election
of law, then within that political unit such portion or portions of this
Agreement will be of no force and effect. . .[.]
Opinion and Order at B-2 to -3, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 82-538 (D.P.R. Nov. 24, 1982) (order compelling arbitration), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 105
S. Ct. 3346 (1985) [hereinafter Order].
17 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3349.
18 Id. During 1980, the automobile market in Puerto Rico was very strong and
Soler exceeded its targeted sales volume of 1992 vehicles. Brief of Respondent and
Cross-Petitioner at 3, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985) (Nos. 83-1569 and 83-1733) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent]. For 1981, Mitsubishi increased Soler's minimum sales volume to 4750 vehicles. Id.
19 Brief of Respondent, supra note 18, at 4.
20

Id.

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 157
(1st Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985). Mitsubishi
stated in a telex of July 8, 1981 that transshipping vehicles to the U.S. mainland
could trigger a control on exports by the Japanese government for the Puerto Rico
market and involved both business and political considerations. Brief of Respondent, supra note 18, at 4-5. Mitsubishi also refused transshipment because the vehicles did not have heaters and defoggers, used only unleaded, high octane fuel
unavailable in Latin America, adequate warranty service could not be ensured, and
that diversion to the mainland would violate a contractual agreement between
Chrysler and Mitsubishi. Id. at 4-7.
21
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of nearly 1000 vehicles which Soler ordered but had not
purchased. 2
In February 1982, Soler formally denied responsibility for
the vehicles and claimed that Mitsubishi's refusal to allow transshipment violated the antitrust laws of the United States and Puerto Rico. 23

The following month, Mitsubishi brought suit

against Soler in the United States District Court for the District
of Puerto Rico alleging breach of contract.24 Mitsubishi moved
for an order compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act 25 and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-

ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards.26 Soler denied the allegations
and filed a counterclaim for alleged antitrust violations, asserting
that both Mitsubishi and CISA divided markets and restrained
trade. 27 In addition, Soler claimed that antitrust issues are nonarbitrable as a matter of law and, consequently, the district court
must stay the arbitration pending adjudication of the antitrust
counterclaims in federal court.28
The district court ordered Mitsubishi and Soler to arbitrate
most of the claims and counterclaims, including Soler's federal
antitrust counterclaim. 29 Although the court recognized that antitrust claims are nonarbitrable in a domestic setting 30 and that
the relationship between Soler and Mitsubishi was truly international, 31 it nevertheless held that Chapter 2 of the Federal ArbiMitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3350.
Id. at 3350-51.
24 Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 157. Mitsubishi also alleged that Soler failed to pay for
the ordered vehicles and that its actions damaged Mitsubishi's warranties and
goodwill. Id.
25 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
26 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3350. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1982) (codification of
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards).
27 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3351. Soler specifically claimed violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7; the Federal Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225; and the Puerto Rico competition statute, P.R. LAws ANN., tit.
10, § 278b (1978 and Supp. 1983). Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3350. Soler further
counterclaimed that Mitsubishi had defamed Soler's "good name and business reputation." Id. at 3350 n.6.
28 Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 158.
29 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3351. The district court held that Soler's defamation
claim and allegations "concerning discriminatory treatment and the establishment
of minimum-sales volumes" were not within the arbitration clause and, therefore,
were not arbitrable. Id. at 3351 n.7.
30 See American Safety Equip. Corp. v.J.P. McGuire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 825-26
(2d Cir. 1968). See also infra notes 78-91 and accompanying text (discussion of
American Safety).
31 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3351.
22

23
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tration Act 32 mandated arbitration in Japan

of the parties'
3
1
disputes.
commercial
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that the antitrust disputes fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement. 34 The court, however, reversed the district
court's holding that the antitrust claims be arbitrated. 35 Relying
on American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co. ,36 which
held that the Federal Arbitration Act does not mandate arbitration of antitrust claims arising in domestic disputes, the court
reasoned that antitrust claims arising in international disputes
are similarly nonarbitrable. 37 The court also distinguished Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co. ,38 which held that claims arising under the
federal securities laws are arbitrable in an international context. 9
The First Circuit reasoned that the public policy interests protected by private enforcement of the antitrust laws are more important than those protected by the securities laws. 4"
The parties appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed
the court of appeals' decision and held that the antitrust dispute
was subject to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. 4 ' In
refusing to extend the American Safety doctrine, the Court stressed
the importance of the federal policy favoring arbitration agreements and the need to avoid parochial application of domestic
law in an international context.4 2
32

See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (discussion of Act).

33 See Order, supra note 16, at B-5 to -8.
34 Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 169. The First Circuit remanded the case to separate
the antitrust issues from the issues that were arbitrable. Id. The court ordered the
district court to determine whether the antitrust issues should be resolved before,
after, or concurrently with the arbitration of the remainder of the dispute. Id.
35 Id. at 166.
36 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). See also infra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
37 Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 166.
38 417 U.S. 506 (1974). See also infra notes 104-18 and accompanying text (discussion of Scherk).
39 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20.
40 Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 168. The court reasoned that the policy underlying the
securities laws is to protect investors while the policy behind antitrust laws "is not
to protect individual companies, but to protect competition." Id. (emphasis in original). The court commented that antitrust laws "protect the general public by preserving a competitive atmosphere that keeps prices down in an entire industry or in
a group of related industries." Id. An example of the importance of the public
interest in private enforcement, in the court's view, is that successful antitrust plaintiffs recover treble damages, while securities plaintiffs only recover actual damages.
Id.
41 See Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3361.
42 Id. at 3356-57. The Court noted that the decisions in The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) and Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506
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The Federal Arbitration Act (Act),4 3 enacted in 1925, grants
to United States courts the power to enforce arbitral agreements,4 4 to stay litigation pending the outcome of arbitration, 45
and to confirm arbitral awards. 46 The Act's declaration that arbi(1974) demonstrated a strong policy in favor of arbitration as a contractual dispute
resolution mechanism and that United States accession to the Convention gives
"special force" to arbitration in an international commercial context. Mitsubishi,
105 S. Ct. at 3357.
43 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
44 Section 4 of the Act reads in pertinent part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition
any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would
have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the
subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner
provided for in such agreement. Five days' notice in writing of such
application shall be served upon the party in default. Service thereof
shall be made in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
45 Section 3 of the Act provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with
such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
46 Section 9 of the Act provides:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the
court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration,
and shall specify the court, then at any time within one year after the
award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so
specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court
must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is
specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be
made to the United States court in and for the district within which such
award was made. Notice of the application shall be served upon the
adverse party, and thereupon the court shall have jurisdiction of such
party as though he had appeared generally in the proceeding. If the
adverse party is a resident of the district within which the award was
made, such service shall be made upon the adverse party or his attorney
as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion in an action in the
same court. If the adverse party shall be a nonresident, then the notice
of the application shall be served by the marshal of any district within
which the adverse party may be found in like manner as other process of
the court.
9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982).
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tration agreements are "valid, irrevocable and enforceable ' 47
provides the basis by which a party aggrieved by the "failure, neglect, or refusal" of another to arbitrate may petition the federal
court for an order compelling arbitration. 4' The Act reversed
"centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements ' 49 and
reflects the congressional desire that federal courts implement
the arbitration process to the fullest extent possible.50 Similar
policies favoring arbitration have developed in other countries
since arbitration has increasingly become recognized as the preferred method of resolving commercial disputes among the
world's trading nations. 5 '
In 1970, the United States ratified the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (Convention). 52 This Convention creates a framework to
facilitate and encourage international arbitration by providing
uniform standards for the enforcement of arbitration agreements
and awards. 53 In addition, the Convention governs arbitration
agreements between United States citizens and citizens of foreign
countries 54 and provides that a court of competent jurisdiction
47 Section 2 of the Act provides:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
48 See supra note 45.
49 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974). See also infra notes
104-18 and accompanying text (discussing Scherk).
50 See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983). In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe Arbitration Act
establishes that, as matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Id. at 24-25.
51 See International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration (Supp. 5, 1986),
Johan Steyn, QC., England, Arbitration Act 1979; Werner Melis, Austria, Federal
Law of February 2, 1983; AlbertJan van den Berg, Saudi Arabia, Arbitration Regulation of Saudi Arabia.
52 See supra note 2. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards is enforced as Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982).
53 See McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral
Awards in the United States, 2J. MAR. L. & COM. 735, 736-46 (1971).
54 See 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982). Section 202 provides:
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may compel arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement whether or not the place of arbitration is within the United
States.5 5
Article II of the Convention contains the provisions concerning the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Article II(1) requires that the courts of a contracting state recognize an
arbitration agreement that "concern[s] a subject matter capable
of settlement by arbitration. '5 6 Article 11(3) requires that a court
refer to arbitration any dispute subject to a recognized arbitration agreement unless the court determines that the agreement is
"null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. '5 7
Article V of the Convention contains the grounds for nonenforcement of awards. Under article V(2), a court may deny recognition if the "subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of [the] country" in which
enforcement is sought, or if "enforcement of the award would be
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a transaction, contract, or agreement described in
section 2 of this title, falls under the Convention. An agreement or
award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a
corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its
principal place of business in the United States.
Id.
55

See 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1982). Section 206 provides:
A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein
provided for, whether that place is within or without the United States.
Such court may also appoint arbitrators in accordance with the provisions of the agreement.

Id.
Article II(l) provides:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
21 U.S.T. 2518, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
57 Article 11(3) provides:
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the
meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer
the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
21 U.S.T. 2518, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
56
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contrary to the public policy of that country." 58
Many parties to disputes have claimed nonarbitrability of an
issue concerning domestic law by relying on article 11(1) as a public policy exception. 5 9 The public policy defense, however, is
only mentioned expressly in article V(2) as a ground for refusing
arbitral awards.6 0 Difficulties, therefore, have arisen in interpreting the drafters' intention to differentiate between actions to enforce the arbitration agreement and actions to enforce the
ultimate award.6 1 In attempting to reconcile article II(1) and
V(2), courts have construed the phrase "capable of settlement by
arbitration" in article II(1) as equivalent to the phrase "capable
of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country" in article V(2)(a). 6 2 As a result, under article II analysis, courts have
subjected arbitration agreements to considerations of national
63
public policy.

Despite the interest of trading nations in the use of arbitration as a means of promoting international commercial relations,
arbitration of public law issues has resulted in controversy con58 Article V(2) provides:

2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of that country.
21 U.S.T. 2518, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
59 See Barry, Application of the Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards under the New York Convention: A Modest Proposal, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 832, 84344 (1978); Ehrenhaft, supra note 4, at 1213-14.
60 See supra note 58.
61 See G. HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS:

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF RECORD OF UNITED NATIONS CON-

May/June 1958, at 24-28 (discussing arbitral agreements), 66-71
(discussing arbitral awards).
62 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d
155 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985). The court
reasoned that inconsistent interpretations of articles II and V would mean that a
matter could be referred to arbitration even though a court could refuse to enforce
the award because it offends national public policy. Id. at 164. The court further
opined that " 'capable' means legally capable-for any matter can theoretically be
arbitrated or compromised, even if the decision be to divide an infant. 1 Kings
3:16-20." Id.
63 Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 164-65. The court noted that the courts of other nations have interpreted the Convention similarly. See id. at 165 n. 10 (citing Belgium
and Italian adjudications); see also Barry, supra note 59, at 835-37; Quigley, Accession
by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1062-64 (1961).
FERENCE
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cerning whether arbitration will adequately protect the public interest involved.64 For example, in the United States, the public
interest served by the private enforcement of securities and antitrust laws conflicts with the national policy favoring commercial
arbitration. 65 The United States Supreme Court initially confronted this conflict between the goals of arbitration and those of
the securities laws in Wilko v. Swan.6 6 In Wilko, a customer
brought suit under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 193367
against a brokerage firm for alleged misrepresentation and omission of material facts in connection with a sale of stock. 68 The
defendant moved to stay litigation and compel arbitration in accordance with the parties' arbitration agreement. 69 The
Supreme Court determined that the strong policy underlying the
Securities Act of 1933 of ensuring a free and orderly securities
market was a necessary component of the free enterprise system. 70 As a result, the Court ruled that judicial settlement of securities claims supplants the policy of the Federal Arbitration
Act.7 ' Furthermore, the Court noted that section 14 of the Securities Act of 193372 specifies that any agreement purporting to
waive compliance with the terms of the 1933 Act is void. 73 Thus,
the Court held that the arbitration agreement was invalid since it
would deprive the aggrieved investor of the right to sue in federal court. 4
Lower courts have similarly found that the public policy in64 SeeJ. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 53165 (1978); A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 6, at 359-82; Barry, supra note 59, at 838-50;
Ehrenhaft, supra note 4, at 1200-19.
65 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (private enforcement of securities laws
supplants national policy favoring arbitration of commercial disputes); see also infra
notes 66-74 and accompanying text (discussion of Wilko); American Safety Equip. v.
J.P. McGuire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); infra notes 78-91 and accompanying text (discussion of American Safety).
66 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
67 The Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1982)). Section 12(2) prohibits fraud or misrepresentation
of a material fact in the sale of a security. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
68 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29.
69 Id. at 429.
70
71
72

Id. at 435.

Id. at 438.
15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security
to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." Id.
73 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77n).
74 Id. at 438. The Court further reasoned that since the protective provisions of
the Securities Act provide for judicial determination to assure their effectiveness,
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terests protected by patent laws,75 the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act,7 6 and the Bankruptcy Reform Act7 7
outweigh the national policy favoring arbitration. In 1968, in
American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co. ,78 the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that litigation of domestic disputes arising under the Sherman Act superseded the policy enunciated by the Federal Arbitration Act.79 In
that case, American Safety entered into a trademark licensing
agreement with Hickok Manufacturing Company which included
a clause requiring arbitration of all future disputes.80 American
Safety later filed suit against Hickok and J.P. McGuire, the assignee of Hickok's royalty rights, 8 ' claiming that the licensing
agreement violated the Sherman Act because it unlawfully extended Hickok's trademark monopoly and unreasonably restricted American Safety's business.8 2 Hickok and J.P. McGuire
demanded arbitration.8 3 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York stayed American Safety's claim
pending arbitration. 4
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court and
held the claim nonarbitrable.8 5 The court reasoned that the complex and diverse nature of antitrust claims and the public interest
in proper enforcement of the antitrust laws required judicial determination of antitrust suits. 8 6 The court proffered four reasons
the congressional intent behind § 14 creates a non-waivable right to sue in federal
courts, which cannot be affected by an arbitration agreement. Id. at 437.
It is important to note that the Wilko Court was concerned with the domestic
applications of the Securities Act of 1933 and with protecting the individual investor, who the Court believed was at a disadvantage compared to issuers and dealers.
Id. at 435.
75 See, e.g., N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp.,
532 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1976); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp.,
433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970).
76 See, e.g., S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l Inc., 745 F.2d 190
(2d Cir. 1984).
77 See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 699 (1984).
78 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
79 Id. at 827-28.
80 Id. at 822.
81 Id. at 823. One provision of the agreement permitted assignment only with
the other party's consent. Id. American Safety Equipment claimed that Hickok's
assignment to J.P. McGuire was invalid under this provision. Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See id. at 828.
86 Id. at 826-27. The court stated that "[tihe Sherman Act is designed to pro-
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to support its judgment that antitrust claims are exempt from arbitration. First, the court noted that the tremendous public interest in a competitive economy, and the embodiment of that
interest in the antitrust laws, precluded arbitration. 7 Second,
the American Safety court remarked that the possible existence of
adhesion clauses in contracts requiring arbitration cautioned
against arbitration.88 Third, the court reasoned that the increasing complexity of antitrust litigation coupled with the diversity
and extensiveness of the evidence warranted litigation. 89 Lastly,
the court concluded that it is undesirable to entrust antitrust matters to commercial arbitrators drawn from the business community. 90 The American Safety court's reasons against arbitrating
antitrust disputes have been embraced by other circuits, however, only when adjudicating disputes among domestic parties. 9 '
Following the American Safety decision, a judicial trend
emerged which recognized arbitration as a viable method of
resolving international commercial disputes.92 This movement
began with the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co. 9 ' In that case, Unterweser, a German company, contracted to tow an off-shore oil drilling rig owned by
Zapata, an American company, from Louisiana to Italy. 94 After
an accident occurred at sea, the drilling rig was brought to
Tampa, Florida and Zapata brought suit against Unterweser for
breach of contract.95 Unterweser moved to stay or dismiss the
mote the national interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting his
rights under the [Sherman] Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who
protects the public's interest." Id. at 826 (citation omitted).
87 See id. at 826-27.
88 See id. at 827.
89 See id.
90 See id.

91 See, e.g., Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576
F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978); Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d
679 (5th Cir. 1976); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 466 F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1972); Helfenbein v. International Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872
(1971); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.
1970).
92 See Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment of Its Remedial
and Substantive Status in TransnationalCommerce, 19 TEX. INT. L.J. 33, 65-76 (1984).
Professor Carbonneau notes that the United States accession to the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 1970 and
its implementation through Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act initiated this
trend.
93 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
94 Id. at 2.
95

Id. at 3-4.
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action by invoking the forum selection clause of the towage contract which provided that "any dispute arising [under the contract] must be treated before the London Court of Justice." 96
Both the district court and the court of appeals declined to dismiss the suit and ordered litigation in a United States district
court.9 7

On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals'
judgment and remanded the case. 98 The Court held that a forum
selection clause in a freely negotiated international commercial
agreement should be enforced "absent a strong showing that it
: * .be set aside." 99 In its analysis, the Court emphasized the
importance of contract obligations and commercial interdependence."' The Court, therefore, rejected the parochial notion
that United States courts should not be "ousted" of jurisdiction
by parties to a commercial agreement. 10 ' Moreover, the Court
recognized that "[w]e cannot have trade and commerce in world
markets and international waters exclusively on 10our
terms, gov2
erned by our laws, and resolved in our courts."'
Two years later, in 1974, the Supreme Court faced the growing discord between the federal courts' commitment to public
law issues and the commitment expressed in the Federal Arbitration Act of favoring arbitration in an international context. '03 In
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 104 a United States cosmetic company
arranged to purchase several European cosmetic enterprises
owned by Scherk, a German citizen. 0 5 The sales agreement between the parties contained a clause by which Scherk warranted
that the trademarks for the cosmetics were unencumbered and
that any future disputes were to be settled by arbitration in Paris
at 2.
at 6-7. The district court relied on Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S.
Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959), which
held that forum selection clauses are presumptively unenforceable because their
effect is to "oust the jurisdiction of the courts." The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 6 (quoting
Carbon Black Export). The court of appeals affirmed and stated that a- forum selection clause should not be enforced unless the contractually specified forum is
clearly more convenient for the parties and witnesses. Id. at 7.
98 The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 20.
99 Id. at 15. According to the Court, the party challenging the clause must
"show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was
invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching." Id.
100 Id. at 8-9.
101 Id. at 9.
102 Id.
103 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 508.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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before the International Chamber of Commerce. 0 6 Alberto-Culver subsequently discovered that the trademarks they acquired
were in fact encumbered 0 7 and brought suit in federal district
court to rescind the transaction.'0 8 In its complaint, Alberto-Culver alleged that it had been defrauded in violation of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193409 and Securities
Exchange Commission rule 1Ob-5.11 0 Scherk, however, initiated
arbitration proceedings and moved for dismissal or a stay of the
lawsuit."' The district court and the Seventh Circuit Court
of
2
Appeals, relying on Wilko, held the dispute nonarbitrable." 1
The Supreme Court reversed and held that agreements to
arbitrate transnational commercial disputes must be respected
and enforced by the judiciary in accordance with the Federal Ar1
bitration Act, despite alleged violations of the securities laws. 3
The Court reasoned that the Wilko rationale did not apply to
Scherk because the underlying agreement was "truly international" in character and as such involved "considerations and
policies significantly different from those found controlling in
Wilko."" 4 The Court upheld the arbitration agreement despite
the fact that the Securities Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction 1 5 and contains a clause prohibiting waiver of compliance with provisions of the Act. 1 6 The Court stated that, in an
international context, the advantages these provisions might afford a party are chimerical because a "parochial refusal" to
honor an international arbitration agreement "would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to se106
107

Id.
Id. at 509.

108 Id.
109 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (prohibiting manipulative or deceptive conduct

in connection with sale or purchase of securities).
110 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 509. For the text of rule lOb-5, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1985).
'''
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 509.
112 Id. at 510.
113 See id. at 519-21.
114 Id. at 515. The Court emphasized that there was no doubt in Wilko that
United States law, and specifically federal securities law, would govern in a dispute
involving a stock purchase agreement. Id. at 515-16. According to the Court,
"[t]he parties, the negotiations, and the subject matter of the contract were all
situated in this country, and no credible claim could have been entertained that any
international conflict-of-laws problems would arise." Id.
115 See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982) (providing courts of the United States with exclusive jurisdiction over securities violations).
116 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514. See 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1982) (prohibiting waiver of
compliance with provisions of securities laws).
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cure tactical litigation advantages." ' 1 7 Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that allowing American standards of fairness to govern
an international controversy would demean "the standards of
justice elsewhere in the world, and unnecessarily exalt[] the primacy of the United States law over the laws of other

countries."' 18
During the years following Scherk, the lower federal courts
faced a growing number of cases involving arbitrability of transnational commercial disputes." 9 For example, in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier
(RAKTA), 12 0 the Second Circuit enforced an arbitration clause
despite strong national concerns favoring adjudication of the dispute.' 2 ' In Parsons, an American corporation entered into an
agreement with RAKTA, an Egyptian corporation, to construct,
supervise, and manage a mill in Egypt.' 2 2 The contract contained both aforce majeure clause 23 and a clause providing for arbitration of disputes before the International Chamber of
Commerce.' 24 During construction of the mill in 1967, Arab-Israeli hostilities led to a rift in relations between the United States
and Egypt and all Americans were expelled from Egypt. 25 Parsons then sought to abandon the project by relying on the force
majeure clause. 1 26 Subsequently, RAKTA commenced arbitration
117 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516-17. The Court reasoned that "if Scherk had anticipated that Alberto-Culver would be able in this country to enjoin resort to arbitration[,] he might have sought an order in France or some other country enjoining
Alberto-Culver from proceeding with its litigation in the United States." Id. at 517.
1 18 Id. at 517 n. 11. It is significant that the Court did not rely on the Convention
or its implementing legislation in reconciling national public policy with international trade interests. The Court, however, did state that "this country's adoption
and ratification of the Convention and the passage of Chapter 2 of the United
States Arbitration Act provide strongly persuasive evidence of congressional policy
consistent with the decision we reach today." Id. at 520 n.15.
119 See, e.g., Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1982); Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); Antco Shipping Co. v. Sidermar S.p.A., 417
F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977).
120 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
121 Id. at 974.
122 Id. at 972.
123 A force majeure clause is defined as a superior or irresistable force which is
"common in construction contracts to protect the parties in the event that a part of
the contract cannot be performed due to causes which are outside the control of
the parties and could not be avoided by exercise of due care." BLAcK's LAw DicTIONARY 581 (5th ed. 1979).
124 Parsons, 508 F.2d at 972.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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proceedings claiming breach of contract. 2 7 The arbitration
ruled that Parsons could
panel issued an award to RAKTA and
1 28
not use the defense of force majeure.
After the arbitrators rendered their decision, Parsons filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York alleging that the award was unenforceable under the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards.1 29 Parsons claimed that under article
V(2) of the Convention, 30 its performance of the contract would
contravene United States public policy in light of the diplomatic
problems between the United States and Egypt.' 3 1 The district
court rejected Parsons's defenses and confirmed the arbitration
award. 32 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision and held that the public policy defense of the Convention must be construed narrowly. 33 A party
invoking the defense, according to the Second Circuit, must
prove that "enforcement [of a foreign arbitral award] would violate the forum state's most basic notion of morality and justice. '131 In the opinion of the court, Parsons had mistakenly
equated national political interests with public policy. 13 5 The

Parsons court determined that such a reading of the Convention
1 36
would be detrimental to its mechanism for enforcement.
Similarly, in the 1976 case of Antco Shipping Co., Ltd. v.
Sidermar S.p.A. ,l1y the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that a dispute concerning the
breach of a shipping contract, which excluded Israel as a loading
127 Id.

128 Id.

Id. at 971-72.
See supra note 58 (text of article V(2)).
Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974.
Id. at 972.
Id. at 974.
Id. The court criticized Parsons' interpretation of the public policy defense as
"a parochial device protective of national political interests." Id. Instead, the court
embraced the view that a "supranational emphasis" be placed on the public policy
exception. Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. The court rejected Parsons's argument-that the article V(2)(a) language
of "subject matter not capable of arbitration under the law of [the forum] country"
as being similar to that of article V(2)(b)-by stating "[t]he mere fact that an issue
of national interest may incidentally figure into the resolution of a breach of contract claim does not make the dispute not arbitrable. Rather, certain categories of
claims may be non-arbitrable because of the special national interest vested in their
resolution." Id. at 975 (emphasis in original).
137 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977).
129
130
131
132
133
134
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port, was arbitrable despite the strong United States policy
against restrictive trade practices. I"8 Relying on Parsons, the
court construed the Convention's public policy defense narrowly
and concluded that the exclusion of Israel as a loading port did
not "contravene the public policy of the United States."'' 3 9 The
court emphasized the importance of international arbitration as
demonstrated by the United States accession to the Convention
and held that disputes must be referred to arbitration unless the
''essence" of the undertaking or the remedy sought was expressly
and entirely prohibited by either statute or by a public policy declaration.140 Furthermore, the court reiterated the pronouncement of the Parsons court that United States national policy
should not be equated with public policy if arbitration is to facilitate transnational trade transactions.141
A further example of thejudiciary's evolving precept that international considerations may override national public policy
when viewing arbitration agreements is found in the 1982 decision of Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno. 14 2 In that case, the First Circuit
held that an arbitration agreement negotiated between Puerto
Rican and Italian companies was valid despite the Puerto Rican
Dealers Act,' 4 3 which declared arbitration agreements "null and
void" in dealership contracts.' 44 Relying on the policy favoring
arbitration exhibited by the United States accession to the Convention, the court reasoned that the goal of the Convention was
"to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial
arbitration agreements in international contracts ....

14"15 There-

fore, the court held that enforcement of the Dealers Act would
contravene the Convention.' 4 6 Moreover, the court noted that
138 See id. at 211, 217. For an enunciation of the United States policy against
restrictive trade practices, see Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-72, 93
Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (1982)).
139 Antco Shipping, 417 F. Supp. at 217. Antco, however, contended that the arbitration agreement was "null and void" under article II of the Convention. Id. at
211-12. The court did not view this provision of article 11(3) as being symmetrical
to the provision of article V which prohibits enforcement because of illegality, unless "enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notions of morality
and justice." Id. at 216 (citing Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 974).
140 Id. at 215. The court stated that even if the exclusion of Israeli ports contravened the public policy of the Export Administration Act, it does not proscribe
Antco's performance as provided for in the contract. Id. at 215-16.
141 Id. at 216-17.
142 684 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1982).
143 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10, § 278b-2 (Supp. 1984).
144 Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187.
145 Id. (quoting Scherk, 417 U.S. at 517 n.10).
146 Id. The court stated that when faced with the question of referring a dispute
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the "parochial interests" of a state are not sufficient to create a
defense to arbitrability under the Convention. 4 7 Accordingly,
the Ledee court determined that article II "must be interpreted to
encompass only those situations-such as fraud, mistake, duress,
and waiver-that
can be applied neutrally on an international
4 8
scale." 1
It was against this background that the United States
Supreme Court rendered its decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 14 Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, refused to extend the American Safety rationale to antitrust disputes arising in an international context and held that
international antitrust issues are arbitrable. 150 Justice Blackmun
initially recognized that the parties intended to arbitrate all potential disputes, including the antitrust claims. 151 Despite Soler's
contention that an arbitration agreement may not encompass
statutory claims unless the parties expressly agreed in their contract to arbitrate them, 15 2 the Court reasoned that the congressional intent behind the Federal Arbitration Act was to favor
enforcement of arbitration agreements involving statutory issues,
unless the statute expressly stated that a waiver
of the right to a
1 53
judicial resolution would not be recognized.
The Court next addressed the issue of whether antitrust
claims between a foreign and domestic party may be arbitrated
under United States law. 154 The Court recognized the concerns
raised in American Safety against arbitrating antitrust disputes arising in a domestic context 155 and these concerns were weighed
against the advantages of arbitration in resolving transnational
commercial disputes and the commitment to enforcing freely neto arbitration under Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, the court has a limited role of addressing four concerns: 1) whether there is a written agreement to
arbitrate the dispute; 2) whether the agreement is for arbitration in a territory of a
Convention signatory; 3) whether the agreement arises out of a commercial legal
relationship; and 4) whether the agreement is an international one. Id. at 186-87.
If these questions are answered affirmatively, the court "must order arbitration,
unless it finds the agreement 'null, void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.' " Id. at 187 (quoting Convention, article 11(3)).
147 Id. at 187.
148 Id. (citing I.T.A.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981)).
149 105 S. Ct. 3346.
150 Id. at 3353-61.
15' Id. at 3355.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See id. at 3354-55.
155 Id. at 3355.
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gotiated clauses.' 56 The Court disagreed with the finding that
potential complexity of issues should preclude arbitration, reasoning that complexity alone should not hinder a tribunal's handling of an antitrust matter. 157 Similarly, the Court was not
persuaded by the argument that arbitrators will not be familiar
with the substance of the antitrust laws. 1 58 As Justice Blackmun

noted, arbitrators are usually experts in their fields and, therefore, will be knowledgeable in the disputed area.' 59 In fact, the
Court noted that the arbitration panel selected to hear the instant
dispute consisted of a former dean of a law school, a former
judge, and a practicing attorney. 160 In addition, the Court rejected the argument that arbitration panels consisting of businessmen would be hostile to the constraints on business conduct
imposed by antitrust law. 161 The Court reasoned that arbitrators
are often selected from the legal community as well, thereby offsetting any bias exhibited by the business community.' 62
The Court then addressed the crux of the American Safety
doctrine--"the fundamental importance to American democratic
capitalism of the regime of the antitrust laws."' 6' The Court accepted the contention that the private cause of action and the
treble damages remedy form a central part of the enforcement
mechanism of antitrust laws; 164 yet, the Court maintained that
this does not compel the conclusion that a remedy can be sought
only in a United States court. 165 The arbitrators, according to
156 Id. at 3357. The Court summarized these concerns as first, the appropriateness of arbitration of antitrust claims in view of the important role played by the
private treble damage actions in enforcement, id.; second, the likelihood that private antitrust disputes will arise from contracts of adhesion militating against forum
selection clauses, id.; third, the complexity of antitrust issues comporting with the
essential attributes of arbitration, namely, speed, efficiency, and use of common
sense and equity, id.; and fourth, the choice of arbitrators from the business community argues against entrusting them with the implementation of business regulatory policy. Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 3357-58.
159 Id. at 3358.
160 Id. at 3358 n. 18. The practicing attorney, in addition to having American
legal training, had published on Japanese antitrust laws. Id.
161 Id. at 3358.
162 Id. In fact, the arbitration panel selected for this dispute consisted of three
Japanese lawyers. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 3358-59. The Court added that the parties will define the authority of
the arbitrator or arbitration panel, and the arbitrators cannot fulfill their responsibilities without taking into consideration the pertinent legal principles that are involved. Id. at 3359.
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the Court, are bound to carry out the intentions of the parties
and, therefore, should be bound to apply the relevant national
law in deciding the dispute. 166 As a result, arbitrating international antitrust disputes does not dispense with the concerns addressed by the existence of a private cause of action under the
antitrust laws. 167
The Court then examined the relevance of the Convention
168
and the protection it offers to United States policy interests.
The Court reasoned that after the arbitration of a dispute has
taken place, the national courts have the power under article
V(2)(b) to refuse enforcement of an award where the "recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country."' 69 Therefore, Justice Blackmun concluded that courts have the opportunity to ensure that the public
interest served by enforcement of antitrust laws has been
70

addressed. 1

Lastly, the majority emphasized the importance of arbitration to the expansion of world trade.' 7 1 While the diversity of
issues presented to arbitral tribunals has increased, the Court
opined that arbitration, as an alternate method of dispute resolution, has only begun to realize its potential. 172 In order to accomplish the goal of facilitating international commercial
relationships, the Court reasoned that national courts must relinquish jurisdiction over issues of domestic law to foreign arbitral
tribunals. 173 Therefore, the Court had no quarrel with the Amencan Safety doctrine as it applied to domestic transactions but concluded that "concerns of international comity," respect for the
abilities of transnational arbitral tribunals, and the need for predictability in the resolution of international commercial disputes
174
require enforcement of international arbitration agreements.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissented from the majority opinion. 175 According to the dissent,
3360.
Id. at 3359. The Court noted that "the international arbitral tribunal owes no
Id.
prior allegiance to the legal norms of particular states .
168 See id. at 3359-60.
169 Id. at 3360 (quoting article V(2)(b)).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 3355.
175 See id. at 3361 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Powell did not participate in
the decision. Id.
166 Id. at
167
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an arbitration clause cannot be construed to encompass a statutory claim that is not expressly identified in the contract.

76

Jus-

tice Stevens reasoned that contracting parties in drafting an
arbitration clause would not presume it to cover a violation of
federal law; rather, the parties would expect an arbitration clause
to encompass only claims arising from a breach of the contract.' 77 Therefore, in the dissent's view, a distinction must be
drawn between contract claims and statutory claims when construing arbitration clauses. 178 According to Justice Stevens, a
statutory claim must be expressed in the arbitration clause;
otherwise, litigation7 9is required to assure consistent application
of statutory rights. 1

Moreover, the dissent asserted that antitrust claims are not
arbitrable under federal law.'80 Justice Stevens noted the importance of antitrust laws to a competitive economy and stressed the
need for private enforcement of those laws. 8 ' Judicial resolution
of antitrust claims, in the dissent's view, must be reserved in order to maintain consistent antitrust standards.' 8 2 The dissent
opined that arbitrating antitrust disputes would lead to inconsistent results because the arbitration proceeding may not address
the complexity of antitrust law
and the arbitrators' decision in
183
reviewable.
not
is
cases
most
Id. at 3362 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3363-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3364-65 (Stevens,J., dissenting). The dissent cited the Court's decision
in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), in which judicial resolution of a statutory claim was mandated despite the federal policy favoring arbitration to support their contention that it would be unreasonable to believe that
Congress intended arbiters to implement federal statutes. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at
3365 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 3365-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that "the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfinding." Id. at
3365 n. 14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent posited that the record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete as judicial factfinding, the
usual rules of evidence do not apply, and rights and procedures common to civil
trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony
under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable. Id. (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956)).
180 Id. at 3367-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181 Id. The dissent stated that the interest in enforcing the antitrust laws has
176
177
178

been protected so fervently because" 'every violation of the antitrust laws is a blow
to the free-enterprise system envisaged by Congress.' " Id. at 3368 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972)).
182 Id. at 3370 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183 Id. The dissent commented "[t]he arbitration procedure.. .does not provide
any right to evidentiary discovery or a written decision, and requires that all proceedings be closed to the public." Id. at 3370 n. 31.
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Justice Stevens then addressed the majority's holding that
the national policy favoring arbitration outweighed Congress's
commitment to judicial resolution of antitrust disputes. 184 Relying on the language of American Safety and the history of antitrust
law, Justice Stevens concluded that the majority placed undue
weight on concerns for international comity.'8 5 The dissent also
questioned the majority's interpretation of the Convention and
reasoned that antitrust
claims are nonarbitrable under article II
86
of the Convention. 1

The dissent adopted the court of appeals' reasoning that the
Convention precludes arbitration in this case because article II
excepts subject matter which is not capable of settlement through
arbitration.1 87 Relying on article V enforcement provisions that
require the subject matter to be capable of settlement under the
laws of the country where enforcement is being sought, the dissent reasoned that article II required that the agreement
itself
1 88
must be capable of resolution under those same laws.
The dissent further reasoned that public policy concerns
preclude arbitration of antitrust issues.' 8 9 According to the dissent, article V(2)(b), which prevents enforcement of an award
contrary to the public policy of the country where enforcement is
sought, applies with equal force to article 11.190 Therefore, the
dissent asserted that both domestic laws and public policy considerations may be invoked at the enforcement stage to render
antitrust issues incapable of arbitration.' 9' Thus, the dissent
would have affirmed the court of appeals' holding that
the anti1 92
trust issue must be resolved in United States courts.
Although the Mitsubishi majority concluded that antitrust isSee id. at 3363, 3369 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 3369-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cited the fact that
American Safety has been followed by five circuits. See id. Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded that "[t]his Court would be well advised to endorse the collective
wisdom of the distinguished judges of the Court of Appeals who have unanimously
concluded that the statutory remedies fashioned by Congress for the enforcement
of the antitrust laws render an agreement to arbitrate antitrust disputes unenforceable." Id. at 3370 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 3371 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187 Id.
188 Id.
184

189 Id.

190 Id.
191 Id. The dissent further reasoned that this construction was supported by the
legislative history of the United States Senate's consent to the Convention. Id. at
3371-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192 See id. at 3361 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sues are arbitrable, the Court nevertheless determined that article V(2)(b) affords United States courts a ground for refusing to
enforce arbitral awards due to public policy concerns. 93 This
apparent contradiction may be explained in part by the Court's
recognition that arbitration would not be mandated if Congress
expressly required judicial resolution of the dispute. 194 Moreover, the Court narrowly interpreted article II's provision for enforcing an arbitral agreement by choosing not to construe article
II as encompassing the public policy exception of article V.' 95
Article V's provisions, according to the Court, are limited to enforcing arbitral awards, not the agreement itself. 196 This strict

interpretation comports with the language of the articles as well
of the Convention favoring arbitration of
as the essence
19 7
disputes.

It should be noted, however, that interpretations of the public policy defense have been the subject of controversy since the
inception of the Convention. 98 In fact, the drafters of the Convention wrestled with the importance that national law and public
policy should take in the actual language of the Convention. 199
Guidance, however, is available from a report issued by the members of the Conference.2 0 0 The report stated that the intention of
the drafters was to restrict the use of the public policy defense
"to cases in which the recognition or enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award would be distinctly contrary to the basic principles
20
of the legal system of the country where the award is invoked." '
Furthermore, by placing the public policy exception in article V
and not article II, it appears that the drafters purposefully created broad instructions on recognizing arbitral agreements so
that the signatory states would not invoke domestic public policy
193 See id. at 3360 n.21. By doing so, the Court intimates that a joint reading of
article II and article V mandates referral of disputes to arbitration.
194 Id. The majority wrote that "we decline to subvert the spirit of the United
States' accession to the Convention by recognizing subject-matter exceptions
where Congress has not expressly directed the courts to do so." Id.
195 See id. at 3361 n.21.
196 See id. at 3360.
197 Id. at 3361 n.21.
198 See generally G. HAIGHT, supra note 61. See also supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
199 See G. HArIrr, supra note 61, at 24-28. See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15.
200 See U.N. ESCOR, Report of the Committee on the Enforcement on International Arbitral Awards at 49, U.N. Doc. E/2704 and corr. 1, D/AC 42/4/Rev./28
(1955).
201 Id.
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issues when parochial interests appeared threatened to prevent
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.2 °2
In its analysis, the Mitsubishi Court did not attempt to thoroughly discuss the Convention. The Court may have avoided a
thorough interpretation of the Convention because of potential
conjecture surrounding any pronouncement of the Convention's
purpose. Had the Court delved into the complex language of the
Convention, its opinion may have been seen as an explanation of
those particular articles confronting the Court. 20 3 Rather, the
Court concentrated on the United States' commitment to the
spirit of the Convention to encourage arbitration of international
commercial disputes. By doing so, the Court accomplished its
objective of bolstering the trend to subordinate parochial national interests to the broader interest of increased world trade.
As a result, the Court solidified the judicial history favoring the
essence of the Convention rather than interpreting its
intricacies .204

Mitsubishi marks an important movement toward internationalization of commercial transactions by adding renewed strength
to arbitration's effectiveness in resolving transnational disputes.
The Court's liberal interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act,
and specifically the Convention, reflects a growing judicial acceptance of arbitration as a suitable alternative to traditional
commercial dispute resolution. The Court's holding may be seen
202 Compare article V(2)(b) (permitting non-enforcement of arbitral awards when
"[tihe recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of [the country where enforcement is sought]") with article II(l) (public policy is not cited as a means of nonenforcement); see generally G. HAIGHT, supra note
61, at 24-28, 67-71; Quigley, supra note 63, at 1062-64, 1070-71. The ambiguity of
the framer's intent concerning the application of the public policy defense has led
some courts to employ article V(2)(b) to avoid enforcing arbitration agreements.
See Barry, supra note 59, at 839; Ehrenhaft, supra note 4, at 1214-15.
203 See Allison, supra note 4, at 436. Professor Allison suggests that the Court
avoided the express language of articles II and V because they present "an interpretive thicket." Id. In analyzing the Court's decision, Allison states his belief that
the Court was "ready to subordinate national policy concerns in the interest of
facilitating full U.S. participation in the world marketplace, regardless of the precise language of the Convention." Id. Moreover, Allison hypothesizes that "the
Court may have furthered the development of an international commercial dispute
resolution system to a greater degree than if the Court had waded into the language of the Convention." Id.
204 The decision in Mitsubishi, along with The Bremen, Parsons, and Scherk, form a
solid progression of American case law in the direction of subordinating national
public policy to the global interests of international commercial relations. See supra
notes 93-102 and accompanying text (discussing The Bremen); supra notes 120-36
and accompanying text (discussing Parsons);supra notes 104-18 and accompanying
text (discussing Scherk).
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as a narrow one in the sense that it recognized the arbitrability of
only international antitrust disputes;2 0 5 yet, the Court delivered a
strong message in favor of subordinating domestic interests in
order that arbitration be employed as a mechanism to resolve international trade disputes. With this precedent, lower courts
have shown that arbitration has the broad potential to resolve
legal claims
arising from commercial and financial
206
transactions.
Thus, although the Mitsubishi decision is a narrow one, it signifies a trend among the judiciary to further the goals of international commercial relations over the extraterritorial application
of domestic laws. 20 7 By strengthening the enforcement mechanism of arbitration clauses through a liberal view of the Convention's pronouncements, the decision may instigate other nations
to formulate broad policies favoring arbitration and eschew the
enforcement of parochial policies. The Mitsubishi decision
portends a policy favoring arbitration which will open the door to
205 Domestic antitrust disputes remain nonarbitrable. See Stendig Int'l, Inc. v.
B&B Italia, S.p.A., 633 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (antitrust claims in domestic
context are nonarbitrable). The Stendig court noted that "Mitsubishi is explicitly limited to an internationalcontext involving multinational agreements calling for international arbitration." Id. at 28 n.1 (emphasis added).
206 Relying on Mitsubishi, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140 (5th
Cir. 1985), held that it had jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court's order
denying a stay pending arbitration in an admiralty dispute. Id. at 1143. The court
stated that it had jurisdiction despite the contrary judicially created rule that arbitration stay orders in admiralty disputes were not appealable. Id. The court held
that under Mitsubishi, it was obligated to enforce transnational arbitration agreements; therefore, any law or decision prior to the United States accession to the
Convention "must be construed as consistent with the Convention or set aside by
it." Id. at 1148. Thus, the court reasoned that since the parties agreed to arbitrate
their disputes, article II of the Convention mandated arbitration. Id. at 1151.
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Chemtex Fibers Inc., 617 F. Supp.
55 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), held that claims arising under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in an international context are arbitrable. Id. at
57. The court cited Mitsubishi's enunciation of a policy favoring arbitration of international commercial disputes and reasoned that the interest of the domestic community in the enforcement of the federal anti-racketeering statute is no stronger
than the interest in Mitsubishi of enforcing American antitrust principles. Id.
See also Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia, 615 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.
1985) (action by corporation against foreign sovereign was arbitrable); Good(e)
Business Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 614 F. Supp. 428 (D.C. Wis. 1985) (Wisconsin
Fair Dealership law prohibiting arbitration of fair dealership claims preempted by
Federal Arbitration Act).
207 See, e.g., Development Bank of the Philippines v. Chemtex Fibers Inc., 617 F.
Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (international RICO claims arbitrable).
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increased international trade with American parties due to the
certainty of enforcement of their arbitration agreements.
Lisa M. Ferri

